Policy On The Move

A SWOT Analysis of the Multilateral System’s Response

More than 4.5 million Venezuelans had fled their country by late 2019 — the largest displacement crisis in Latin American history. The multilateral system, led by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), launched the Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan (RMRP) to coordinate the humanitarian response. But as host governments began scaling back their commitments and regional solidarity fractured, a harder question emerged: does the multilateral system have the tools to manage a crisis of this magnitude?

This analysis examines that question through a SWOT framework — assessing the internal strengths and weaknesses of the multilateral system, and the external opportunities and threats shaping its response to the Venezuelan migration crisis.

Strengths

The multilateral system’s greatest assets are its people and its foundational principle. International organizations bring specialized expertise in foreign relations, humanitarian law, and migration policy — knowledge that host governments need to navigate an evolving crisis without inadvertently violating international norms. Staff at IOM, UNHCR, and related bodies serve as institutional memory and coordination infrastructure, reducing the risk of refoulement and regional instability.

Equally important is the principle of multilateralism itself — the idea that complex transnational challenges require cooperative, multi-actor responses. In a region where migration flows cross dozens of borders and affect communities at varying scales, no single government can manage this alone.

Weaknesses

The multilateral system’s authority is delegated, not sovereign — and that limitation is its most significant structural weakness. Member states remain deeply reluctant to cede control to international organizations, viewing expanded multilateral authority as a threat to national sovereignty. The result is a system that can coordinate and recommend but cannot compel.

This constraint is compounded by chronic underfunding. The RMRP’s success depended on sustained financial contributions from Member states — contributions that were inconsistent and insufficient. Without reliable funding, multilateral actors struggle to maintain even core humanitarian services: healthcare, food assistance, and education for displaced populations. As the crisis deepens, these gaps widen.

Opportunities

The most significant opportunity lies in regional cooperation already underway. Colombia’s Special Stay Permit (PEP) — which granted temporary legal status and work authorization to hundreds of thousands of Venezuelans — demonstrated that pragmatic, rights-respecting responses are politically viable. When host governments provide legal pathways, displaced populations become contributors to local economies rather than burdens on them.

The Venezuelan diaspora represents a second underutilized asset. Venezuelans living abroad sent nearly USD $2 billion in remittances home in 2017. Beyond financial flows, diaspora communities can serve as advocates, bridging international attention and on-the-ground realities in ways that formal institutions cannot.

Threats

Two threats stand above the rest: geopolitics and xenophobia.

President Maduro’s alliances with Russia, China, Cuba, and Turkey have complicated international consensus on Venezuela at every turn. This geopolitical bloc creates structural resistance to coordinated pressure on Caracas, limiting the options available to multilateral actors and regional governments alike. The Syria precedent looms large — a misaligned international response risks prolonging rather than resolving the crisis.

Meanwhile, public sentiment in host countries has shifted. In Colombia, Peru, and elsewhere, rising anti-immigrant sentiment has given political cover to governments seeking to restrict entry and reduce services for Venezuelans. Xenophobia is not incidental to this crisis — it is a structural threat to the humanitarian response, and one that multilateral actors have been slow to counter with effective public communications.

Recommendations

Three priorities should guide the multilateral system’s approach:

Engage the diaspora. Remittances, advocacy, and cross-border activism represent an underutilized resource. Diaspora engagement can reduce the financial burden on host communities while maintaining pressure on the Maduro government.

Secure sustainable funding. Fiscal shortfalls remain the system’s most immediate operational constraint. The United Nations and partner organizations must develop innovative financing mechanisms and hold Member states accountable to their donor obligations.

Reframe the crisis as a global challenge. The perception that Venezuela is a regional problem has allowed non-regional actors to underinvest. As the crisis compounds existing instabilities across Latin America, the international community must treat it with the same urgency extended to the Syrian displacement crisis.

Conclusion

The Venezuelan migration crisis tests the multilateral system at its structural limits. The tools exist — specialized staff, established legal frameworks, coordination mechanisms — but the authority to deploy them effectively does not. Xenophobia, geopolitical obstruction, and chronic underfunding remain formidable constraints. Bright spots exist: Colombia’s legal pathways for Venezuelan migrants offer a replicable model. But replication requires political will that the multilateral system can encourage but cannot manufacture.

What this crisis ultimately demands is not a reinvention of multilateralism — it is a recommitment to it.

Originally written May 2020 | IAFF 6118: Re-Inventing the United Nations, Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University / This analysis was originally prepared as a policy memorandum for Dr. Eduardo Stein Barillas, Joint Special Representative of UNHCR and IOM for Venezuelan Refugees and Migrants

Johnnie Williams, M.A.