Policy On The Move

In August 2017, the Trump administration was weighing unilateral economic sanctions against Venezuela as a tool for removing President Nicolás Maduro from power. The situation in Venezuela was deteriorating rapidly — political crisis, economic collapse, and a deepening humanitarian emergency had destabilized the country and sent shockwaves across the region.

This memo, prepared as a policy analysis exercise, argued against unilateral sanctions and in favor of multilateral diplomacy. Nearly eight years later, the argument holds.

The Situation

Venezuela was — and remains — a country in compounding crisis. The collapse of global oil prices from $150 to $40 per barrel devastated an economy almost entirely dependent on petroleum exports, which accounted for roughly 90 percent of GDP. The Maduro government’s response — price controls, expropriation of private companies, and political repression — accelerated the deterioration rather than arresting it.

By 2017, the consequences were severe: significant shortages of food, medicine, and housing; unemployment at 7.3 percent and rising; and a homicide rate that placed Venezuela among the most dangerous countries in the world. Millions of Venezuelans were divided between those demanding Maduro’s removal and those who remained committed to Chavismo. The country was, in short, a tinderbox.

Why Unilateral Sanctions Were the Wrong Tool

Three considerations argued against unilateral U.S. economic sanctions:

Nationalism. Maduro had long blamed Venezuela’s crisis on U.S. geopolitical interference — an “economic war” designed to unseat him. Unilateral sanctions would validate that narrative, potentially consolidating support among Maduro’s base and deepening anti-American sentiment across a region already skeptical of U.S. intentions. The goal was Maduro’s removal; unilateral sanctions risked making him a martyr.

Adaptation. Venezuela maintained significant trade relationships with Colombia, Brazil, Cuba, the Netherlands, and China. Unilateral U.S. sanctions could be circumvented by redirecting trade to these partners — undermining the intended economic pressure while damaging the perception of U.S. leadership both regionally and globally. Sanctions without multilateral buy-in are, historically, porous instruments.

Political fragmentation. Venezuelans were deeply divided. Economic coercion applied from the outside does not resolve internal ideological divisions — it often hardens them. The risk of a Venezuela that descended into civil conflict, in the words of the memo, becoming “Libya-esque in our backyard,” was a real one that unilateral action did nothing to mitigate.

The Recommendation: Multilateral Diplomacy

Three alternative options were available to the Trump administration:

Multilateral diplomacy through the OAS, WTO, and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) — building regional consensus, reducing the perception of U.S. imperialism, and undermining Venezuela’s ability to use oil as economic leverage over dependent neighbors.

International attention through the United Nations — directing Ambassador Nikki Haley to elevate the Venezuelan crisis at the Security Council, increasing global visibility and creating space for financial and humanitarian assistance to opposition groups.

U.S. legislation — withdrawing development assistance conditioned on democratic reforms while recommitting to the Caribbean Energy Security Initiative, reducing the energy leverage Venezuela held over Caribbean island nations.

The recommendation was clear: pursue multilateral diplomacy. Unilateral sanctions had failed as a coercive tool against North Korea, Iraq, and Cuba. There was no compelling reason to expect a different outcome in Venezuela — and significant reason to expect that the costs, in terms of regional relations and humanitarian consequences for everyday Venezuelans, would be substantial.

What Happened

The Trump administration imposed unilateral sanctions. The Maduro government remained in power. The Venezuelan crisis deepened. More than six million Venezuelans fled the country — the largest displacement crisis in Latin American history. The humanitarian consequences of both the regime’s failures and the international response to them continue to be felt across the Americas.

The argument for multilateral diplomacy was not naive idealism. It was a recognition that coercion without coalition is, at best, ineffective — and at worst, counterproductive. That lesson remains as relevant today as it was in 2017.

This analysis was originally prepared as a policy memorandum for IAFF 6503: Political Analysis at the Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University, August 2017.

Johnnie Williams, M.A.